![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
maryxmasвзято тут -- http://bbb.livejournal.com/1118892.html?thread=4941484
Терри Мартин (http://www.art.man.ac.uk/HISTORY/ahrbproj/web/resources/Essays/BASEES_2002/martin.pdf) (текста там уже нет, кстати):
The original Bolshevik policy of supporting the “forms” of nationhood is by now quite familiar to Soviet specialists. Less clear, however, is our understanding of the role assigned to the Russians in this scheme, although this was probably the most important single aspect of the policy. I have described the goal of the Soviet nationalities policy as defusing nationalism by promoting the forms of nationhood, but a better summary might be that it was a conscious strategy to prevent the emergence among non-Russians of the subjective perception that they were living in a Russian empire.
<...>
Lenin and Stalin understood this fact, and therefore the Soviet Union was explicitly conceived as an anti-imperial state in both its foreign and its domestic policies. Russians, therefore, were originally required to downplay their national identity. There was no Russian Communist Party and no Russian republic (only a multi-national all-Russian federated republicthe RSFSR); Russians alone were ineligible for Soviet affirmative action policies; while the Russian language remained dominant in practice, its status was formally downgraded in the national territories where Russians were asked to learn and use the native languages; and much of traditional Russian culture was scapegoated as the culture of oppression and empire. This formally unequal national status of the Russians was institutionalized in the “greater danger” principle, which stated that Russian nationalism, as the nationalism of the former oppressor, was more dangerous than the non-Russian nationalisms of the formerly oppressed. Ironically, this preserved the national structure of the old empire as, in an important sense, the Russians remained the Soviet Union’s state-bearing people, only now they were asked to accept a formally unequal national status to further the cohesion of the anti-imperial multinational state.
<...>
<...однако к концу 20-х годов...> the original Soviet nationalities policy had failed to provide a sufficient integrating national principle for the multiethnic Soviet state and needed to be revised substantially. This revision took place in a piecemeal fashion in the period from 1933 to 1938. <...> Russians were given a central, superior status, but Russification was neither implied nor was it pursued.
<...>
<...в итоге...> The third and most fundamental contradiction arose from the combination of the 1920s-era policy of non-Russian nation-building, a policy whose entire raison d’etre was to convince non-Russians that they were not living in a Russian imperial state, with the 1930s-era innovation of explicitly, publicly and quite crassly celebrating Russian priority within that state. This policy certainly had the potential to produce the worst of both worlds. On the one hand, non-Russians were systematically being inculcated with the belief that they were distinct nations with their own national cultural identity – indeed with a primordially-understood identity that reached back centuries in time and whose essence was shared with all co-nationals (and was registered on their passports) – and whose nations had the right to self-determination. On the other hand, they were told that Russians were a superior, benevolent elder brother whose paternalistic care for them was not just a fact of current Soviet realities but also extended back deep into the prerevolutionary past. In many ways, this would seem like a conscious and highly effective recipe for producing the subjective perception of empire.
<...>
<...таким образом...> it does seem to me that the subjective perception of empire among non-Russians and of the burden of empire among Russians was important, perhaps even crucial, in the final collapse of the Soviet Union and that the structural roots of this perception do lie in the ad hoc policy changes made in the mid-1930s.
Терри Мартин (http://www.art.man.ac.uk/HISTORY/ahrbproj/web/resources/Essays/BASEES_2002/martin.pdf) (текста там уже нет, кстати):
The original Bolshevik policy of supporting the “forms” of nationhood is by now quite familiar to Soviet specialists. Less clear, however, is our understanding of the role assigned to the Russians in this scheme, although this was probably the most important single aspect of the policy. I have described the goal of the Soviet nationalities policy as defusing nationalism by promoting the forms of nationhood, but a better summary might be that it was a conscious strategy to prevent the emergence among non-Russians of the subjective perception that they were living in a Russian empire.
<...>
Lenin and Stalin understood this fact, and therefore the Soviet Union was explicitly conceived as an anti-imperial state in both its foreign and its domestic policies. Russians, therefore, were originally required to downplay their national identity. There was no Russian Communist Party and no Russian republic (only a multi-national all-Russian federated republicthe RSFSR); Russians alone were ineligible for Soviet affirmative action policies; while the Russian language remained dominant in practice, its status was formally downgraded in the national territories where Russians were asked to learn and use the native languages; and much of traditional Russian culture was scapegoated as the culture of oppression and empire. This formally unequal national status of the Russians was institutionalized in the “greater danger” principle, which stated that Russian nationalism, as the nationalism of the former oppressor, was more dangerous than the non-Russian nationalisms of the formerly oppressed. Ironically, this preserved the national structure of the old empire as, in an important sense, the Russians remained the Soviet Union’s state-bearing people, only now they were asked to accept a formally unequal national status to further the cohesion of the anti-imperial multinational state.
<...>
<...однако к концу 20-х годов...> the original Soviet nationalities policy had failed to provide a sufficient integrating national principle for the multiethnic Soviet state and needed to be revised substantially. This revision took place in a piecemeal fashion in the period from 1933 to 1938. <...> Russians were given a central, superior status, but Russification was neither implied nor was it pursued.
<...>
<...в итоге...> The third and most fundamental contradiction arose from the combination of the 1920s-era policy of non-Russian nation-building, a policy whose entire raison d’etre was to convince non-Russians that they were not living in a Russian imperial state, with the 1930s-era innovation of explicitly, publicly and quite crassly celebrating Russian priority within that state. This policy certainly had the potential to produce the worst of both worlds. On the one hand, non-Russians were systematically being inculcated with the belief that they were distinct nations with their own national cultural identity – indeed with a primordially-understood identity that reached back centuries in time and whose essence was shared with all co-nationals (and was registered on their passports) – and whose nations had the right to self-determination. On the other hand, they were told that Russians were a superior, benevolent elder brother whose paternalistic care for them was not just a fact of current Soviet realities but also extended back deep into the prerevolutionary past. In many ways, this would seem like a conscious and highly effective recipe for producing the subjective perception of empire.
<...>
<...таким образом...> it does seem to me that the subjective perception of empire among non-Russians and of the burden of empire among Russians was important, perhaps even crucial, in the final collapse of the Soviet Union and that the structural roots of this perception do lie in the ad hoc policy changes made in the mid-1930s.
![[identity profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/openid.png){kind=small}
no subject
Date: 2007-10-31 08:44 pm (UTC)no subject
Date: 2007-10-31 08:49 pm (UTC)no subject
Date: 2007-10-31 09:30 pm (UTC)no subject
Date: 2007-10-31 09:36 pm (UTC)пишут, пишут... отнять бы все и поделитькуда понятнее для масс теория о том, что национализм придумали жб-натовцы, чтобы ослабить Россию, поссорить братские народы и зохавать все недра Сибири.no subject
Date: 2007-10-31 10:02 pm (UTC)